This paper explores the potential benefits and losses from integration in the Maghreb region, evaluates the urgency and points to the obstacles that will have to be overcome in achieving it, drawing on practical experiences and the characteristics of the economies of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Lessons are also drawn from past experience of integration, together with the reasons for its failure to date. The external dimension associated with the particular status of Europe in the external relations of the Maghreb are taken into consideration in identifying potential complementarities and merits of free trade with the EEC. The paper concludes that for the advantages of integration in the Maghreb to manifest themselves, there is a need for further progress in political and economic reforms. 
Recent years have seen the return to the spotlight of the theme of regional integration. This resurgence of interest in regional integration has manifested itself in the implementation of many free trade area projects throughout the world, such as the EEC, NAFTA, MAU, etc. However, the results achieved by these projects vary considerably. The experience of the European Community is undoubtedly the most spectacular, having succeeded in spite of various problems along the way. The experience in North America (NAFTA) is still too recent for us to be able to assess its results. In the developing countries, in contrast, the experiences of integration have tended to be a failure (de Melo and Panagariya, 1992 The aim of the present paper is to tackle the problems surrounding regional integration in the Indeed, at a time when Europe is having to face up to the consequences of the collapse of Communism, and the countries of the Maghreb are re-launching the idea of integration through the creation of the MAU, we consider it to be important to look at the costs and the benefits of regional integration for the future of the Maghreb.
In order to explore the potential benefits and losses of integration in the Maghreb, to evaluate the degree of urgency associated with it, and to point out the obstacles that will have to be overcome in achieving it, we shall draw on theoretical arguments, practical experiences and the characteristics of the economies involved (their consistency and their complementarity). Valuable lessons for the implementation of the integration project in the
I
For a detailed analysis of the content of this agreement and its state of advancement, see Finaish and Bell, 1994. 2 Although the assessment of these risks is not the aim of our study, we wanted to point this out from the outset, because it is so crucial to take them into account when any assessment is made of the benefits of economic integration in the region. 1 region will be drawn from past experience of integration in the Maghreb, together with the reasons for its failure.
The external dimension associated with the particular status of Europe in the external relations of the Maghreb -i.e. commercial exchanges, historical ties, geographical proximity -need to be taken into account in order to identify the possible complementarity between integration in the Maghreb and the relations with the EEC. This consideration will also render it possible to examine the relevance of an alternative scenario whereby integration with the EEC would be substituted to the integration in the Maghreb. This is not just a theoretical exercise: the issue has been raised on a number of occasions and was even considered by Morocco in 1985, when it applied for membership of the EEC.
Before embarking upon the analysis, it is important to define the scope of the present study. Firstly, the examination will confine itself to integration as between the three countries of the central Maghreb, i.e. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. This means leaving out two of the countries involved in the MAU project, Libya and Mauritania. This restriction on the scope of the investigation can be explained by reference to political and economic reasons, which will be expanded upon in the coming sections. Nevertheless, we can point out from the outset the great gap between the political system in Libya and those of the central Maghreb counthes, and also to the major disparities in levels of development between the central Maghreb and Mauritania, and to the many regional involvements of the latter. Secondly, although the problem of Islamic fundamentalism and moves towards normal democratic conditions in Algeria represent serious obstacles to Maghreb integration, they will not be addressed. Any detailed examination of these matters would go beyond the remit of our study. Filled with optimism, we shall assume that the crisis will be successfully weathered. 
Current problems
Aside from the problems of demographic growth and unemployment, which are con-rn-ion to the three countries of the Maghreb, these countries also have to cope with a certain number of structural difficulties whose management will be the challenge for the years to come Algeria is gradually emerging from over twenty years of centralised planning. In economic terms, there are several difficulties facing the country. First, a misallocation of resources due to the centralised planning system which led to frenzied industrialisation during the 1970s. Second, a substantial demographic growth pattern, which, when combined with the very capitalistic industrialisation of the economy, has served to exacerbate the increase in unemployment. The third factor is the excessively great dependence of the Algerian economy on hydrocarbons.
Since 1986, Algeria has adopted major institutional reforms giving more room to the mechanisms of the market. Agriculture has been privatised and public companies given greater autonomy in terms of management, production, investments and financing. In 1989, autonomous commercial banks emerged. Prices, exchange rates and interest rates were adjusted. Although these reforms represent a decisive step in the right direction, much still remains to be done, and many problems to be resolved. In the medium term, it will be necessary to combat unemployment, sustain growth and reduce the dependence on hydrocarbons. Progress still needs to be made in the liberalisation of the economy if these aims are to be achieved.
Morocco looks like the poorest of the countries in the Maghreb. Its main resources are huge deposits of phosphates, massive agricultural lands and a long sea coast (fishing and tourism). The striking inequality in income and the persistence of poverty are major problems affecting the development of the country. The rate of illiteracy, especially in rural areas, and the poverty of the rural regions, act as a deterrent to investment outside the main urban centres. In this connection, the high rate of population growth does not help matters.
This analysis draws primarily on IBRD, 1990. Since 1983, Morocco has been engaged upon a massive programme of structural reforms to the economy, making room for the mechanisms of the market. This programme encompassed opening up to international trade, abandoning price controls, reducing subsidies to consumption and increasing agricultural prices, plus tax reforms (VAT was introduced in 1986) . Since 1987, Morocco has embarked upon a policy of public-sector rationalisation and the privatisation of certain public enterprises. After some painful years of restructuring, Morocco is now turning in good economic performances. However, it has had to pay a sizeable cost, particularly in terms of youth unemployment, as a result of the budgetary austerity. For the future, Morocco has to sustain its growth, reduce its debts, combat poverty, inequality of income and unemployment, and also invest in human capital.
Tunisia is the smallest of the Maghreb countries, in terms both of area and of population. In spite of having rather modest natural resources, Tunisia has been making significant economic and social progress. As well as oil and phosphates, tourism plays an important part in the Tunisian economy. Like the other countries of the Maghreb, Tunisia, too, is faced with the problems of demographic growth and unemployment. Since 1986, the country has undertaken reforms involving opening its economy and giving more scope for the private sector. Price controls have gradually been dismantled, the tax system has been reformed, the State is withdrawing from enterprises which are not a natural monopoly, and anti-trust legislation is being prepared. Like many countries dependent upon the European market, Tunisia is anxious about its outlets following the upheavals in Europe.
II. External trade in the Maghreb
Regional integration, by dismantling the barriers to trade between countries, yields certain advantages. From the internal angle, the bulk of the benefits derives from the better reallocation of productive activities, leading to the intensification of trade between the member states. These reallocation benefits derive their theoretical foundation from the existence of comparative advantages (see, for example, Balassa, 1961) and economies of scale (see Helpman and Krugman, 1985) . Seen from outside the region, integration can be beneficial through the attraction it can have for direct foreign investment 5. The theoretical foundations of this attractiveness derive from the new theory of economic geography (Krugman, 1991) . 5 These internal and external benefits wifi be further discussed in Section V.
In order to appreciate the potential benefits of integration in the Maghreb, we examine the schemes and structures of commercial trade in the region. For the same reasons as in the previous section, the analysis will include the European dimension. As far as imports are concerned, industrial supplies occupy the top position in the Maghreb, followed by equipment, consumption goods and fuel (except in Algeria, of course).
3. Analysis of trade by sector and by partner Table 5 shows the breakdown of the trade between the Maghreb and the EEC. Algeria exports almost nothing but energy products to the EEC, while Morocco exports foodproducts and manufactured goods (textiles). Tunisia exports primarily manufactured goods (textiles), and to a lesser extent, energy products. The Maghreb countries import machinery and transport equipment and manufactured goods from the EEC. In Algeria, though, imports of food products are greater than those of manufactured goods.
To sum up, the structure of trade between the Maghreb and the EEC is like that of the Maghreb trade in general. This is not surprising given the importance of the EEC as a commercial partner of the Maghreb. 
The commercial regime
The data we have for the study of the commercial regime of the Maghreb countries are fairly complete for Morocco but poor for the other two countries. The information on Morocco comes from the GATT report of 1989. There does not appear to be any similar report for Algeria or Tunisia. As far as these countries are concerned, therefore, the amount of work required would go beyond the scope of the present paper. Nonetheless, we do know that for some years now, Tunisia has been engaged in a huge liberalisation programme for its foreign trade, which has led to the removal of controls on a large range of products. The products affected by this currently cover 65% of the total imports. Algeria, in the framework of its economic reform, has substantially relaxed the tcurrency..budget' system which vested in the central administration the control of the currencies to be used for imports. Moreover, the State no longer has a monopoly on foreign trade. Since 1988, private enterprises (whether national or foreign) have been able, in principle, to engage in trade with abroad.
In Morocco, since the beginning of the 80s, a series of foreign-trade reforms have been adopted. The main modification brought about by the reform is the replacement of a system of protection based upon the direct control of the volume of imports by one of protection based upon customs duties. Import licences were the main instrument for the exercise of control over the volume of imports. Currently this scheme covers less than 13% of imports. The State also exercises a monopoly on the import and marketing of agricultural and petroleum products and on the export of phosphates.
Under the framework of the quantitative control of imports, products were divided up between three lists: A, B and C. List A covered free-import products, list B products whose import was subject to State authorisation, and list C products of which the import was prohibited. This last list was abolished in 1986. Furthermore, a large number of products have been gradually transferred from list B to list A. As early as 1989, the share of products on list A already accounted for 88% of imports into Morocco.
Customs duties have gradually come to replace the scheme of licences as an instrument of protection. Customs duties are applied in the same way to imports from all sources and are ad valorem. In the framework of the reform to foreign trade, the maximum rate has changed from 400% in 1982 to 45% in 1986. The spectrum of customs duties has also been reduced. At present, over 40% of imports are subjected to a rate of under 3% and 70% are subjected to a rate of under 20% (Haddad, 1993) .
The reference prices or minimum prices occupy the third place in the range of instruments of protection. This system is used as an 'anti-dumpingt measure and is designed primarily to allay the fears of the industrialists as far as their competitiveness is concerned. This type of price applies mainly to textiles, paper, metals, spare parts for motor vehicles, and rubber tyres. The impact of these prices has also been diminished over time. Other instruments with a more limited impact are employed in the framework of commercial policy, such as special import taxes, stamp duties, sanitary standards and regulations, etc.
Liberalisation of trade and economic performances : the example of Morocco
The aim of the reform of the commercial regime in the Maghreb is, of course, to improve the performance of the economies. As we pointed out at the beginning of this section, the arguments underpinning this expectation are a better re-allocation of resources, economies of scale, competition, etc. Empirical verification of the effects of these arguments is confronted by many obstacles, of which the main one is of a statistical nature. The point is that the level of aggregation of the data generally available does not make it possible to perfofm an analysis sufficiently detailed to show up the effects.
In the Maghreb, as elsewhere, this statistical problem and the fact that the reforms are still quite recent mean that no serious analysis of the effects on the economy of opening up to trade can be undertaken. Morocco is the exception in this instance. Thanks to the fact that its reforms go back a relatively long time (1983) , and that a good detailed survey was carried out among enterprises by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Haddad (1993) has been able to conduct a fine analysis of the linkage between the liberalisation of trade and productivity in Morocco. To our knowledge, there is no study of a similar scale for the other two Maghreb countries.
The survey covered industrial enterprises. It deals with the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] , and exhaustively encompasses all enterprises employing more than ten person, and those with fewer than ten person but with a turnover of over 100,000 Dirhams.
On the basis of the data in this survey, Haddad (1993) has conducted an econometric study to show the effects of the different variables (commercial policy, market structure, etc.) on the productivity and efficiency of the enterprises. The results reveal a positive and significant effect of the opening up to trade on productivity. This positive effect takes three different forms the promotion of exports, the liberalisation of imports, and the arrival of direct investments. In addition, when estimates are made by distinguishing the protected sectors from the exposed sectors, the positive impact on productivity of opening up to trade is even more significant.
The liberalisation of Morocco's foreign trade has therefore had a beneficial effect on the country's industry, in so far as the improvements in productivity arising from it will make for enhanced competitiveness and greater output. In terms of the economy in general, an industrial base that performs better serves to promote growth and employment in the long term. Moreover, the credibility of the reform seems to have attracted foreign investment, which helps to encourage growth.
The implications for integration in the Maghreb
The above analysis reveals a number of points which are of importance in connection with the regional integration of the Maghreb. The first is associated with the convergence of the three countries towards an economic system which favours freedom of trade and the mechanisms of the market. It represents a positive point which should serve to facilitate integration. The second has to do with the positive impact of the liberalisation of trade on the Moroccan economy. It tends to indicate that we can expect the same sort of positive effect on the economies of its two other parthers. The third point, constitutes the main problem for regional integration in the Maghreb. It relates to the very low level of intraMaghreb trade, and leaves it likely that there will be minor gains in specialisation to be made in the short term.
The low level of intra-Maghreb trade is more striking when compared to the role of the EEC (over 50% of Maghreb trade) as a trading partner of the Maghreb. This comparison may legitimately be invoked by those in favour of substituting the integration of the Maghreb by the integration of those countries with the EEC. However, we do not believe that this scenario would be realistic in the medium term. The point is that the Maghreb's exports are based principally upon agricultural products, agro-industry, chemicals and textiles, placing these countries in direct competition with the countries in the south of Europe. It is likely, therefore, that these European countries will have some reservations about enlarging the Community to include the countries of the Maghreb. These reservations will be accepted by the other European countries since the Maghreb takes only a small part of the exports of the member states of the EEC. In addition, as it was seen from the analysis of Section I, the countries of the Maghreb are poorer and more agricultural than any of the Community states. The likelthood is thus that the outcome of enlargement would be sizeable transfers from the EEC to the Maghreb countries. So for political and economic reasons, it is most unlikely that the member states would be prepared to go along with such transfers.
Given that the low level of mtra-Maghreb trade constitutes a problem for the integration project, it would be interesting to study its causes and look at potential solutions. There are various possible causes for this low level of intra-Maghreb trade. The existence of so few complementarities between the productive structures (exports from one country do not constitute imports into the others), the poor level of competitiveness of the Maghreb industries (due to a number of years of protectionism) and the size and purchasing power of the local markets, seem to be crucial. Other factors, such as communications difficulties (transport and telecommunications networks) between the countries, the exchange controls which for so long have been strictly enforced in these countries, or political tensions (as witness the absence of exchanges between Morocco and Algeria prior to 1987) are also of importance.
In view of these points, the progress of intra-Maghreb trade and the integration of their economies seems to be dependent upon the resolute advance of the economic reforms embarked upon, the smoothing over of political differences and the improvement of the communications infrastructures between the countries. To this must be added the role of foreign capital and direct investment as a way of adding a fresh dynamism to the productive structure and perhaps of redressing the lack of complementarity of the Maghreb economies.
III. Experiences of integration in the Maghreb 1. Past experience Since the 1950s, the idea of integration has been the subject of some 20 agreements between the countries (Lakhoua, 1993) . Among the most important are the creation in 1964 of the Maghreb permanent consultative committee, which also embraced Libya. Its mission was to pave the way for the economic unity of the four countries. This orgamsation gradually just faded into oblivion. The crisis between Algeria and Morocco over the former Spanish Sahara put a stop to any further initiatives involving the three countries.
In 1983, Algeria and Tunisia signed a treaty to which Libya and Mauritania were also due to accede. However, the project never got properly formalised because of differences of opinion between Tunisia and Libya and the exclusion of Morocco.
In 1984, Libya and Morocco announced at Oujda the creation of the Arab-African Union, consigned to oblivion after the visit by Shimon Peres to Morocco in 1986. In the meantime, Morocco lodged an application for membership of the EEC (Flory, 1984) .
The failure of the plans for partial integration in the region showed that for a real grouping to emerge, it was first necessary to bring about a reconciliation between Algeria and Morocco. This was finally achieved, and diplomatic relations re-established in 1988. The following year, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia announced the creation of the Maghreb Arab Union, MAU.
As is usual in the Arab world in general, the initiatives aimed at economic integration in the Maghreb got into an impasse. The failure of these initiatives has been put down to various factors (Lakhoua, 1993) including a lack of political will and the incompatibility of the political systems. Governments are sometimes lukewarm in their enthusiasm for integration, because it deprives them of their sovereignty over certain matters of economic policy. In addition, where integration involves countries with differing economic and political orientations (e.g. market economies or planned economies) it is unlikely to succeed.
The Maghreb Arab Union (MAU)
In February 1989, the MAU Treaty was concluded in Marrakesh. It was to be ratified within six months of its signature (Gherari, 1990) . However, by 1992, Morocco had not yet ratified the conventions signed since the creation of the Union (Valmont, 1993) . The MAU gave itself an institutional apparatus made up of three types of body: political bodies (Presidential Council, Council of Ministers, Consultative Council); executive bodies (Supervisory Comniittee, Ministerial Committees, General Secretariat) and bodies with jurisdiction (ten magistrates).
The MAU's provisions are of a political nature (e.g. co-ordination of foreign policies, safeguarding territorial integrity and political independence), a cultural nature (e.g. exchanges of teaching staff and students), and an economic nature. We shall focus more on the economic project. At this level, the treaty sets itself the aim of progressively bringing about the free circulation of goods, services, persons and capital between the member states.
It also provides for a common policy so as to achieve economic, agricultural, commercial and social developments in the member states. Concrete measures for the realisation of these aims have been examined by the various sub-committees set up after the Marrakesh meeting. The economics sub-committee, for instance, has defined four stages for integration: the creation of a free-trade area, a customs union, a common market and finally the harmonisation of economic policies in various areas. The social and human affairs subcommittee laid down provisions deriving from the principle of the free circulation of persons: residence, employment, property, common identity cards, etc.
Alongside the multilateral agreement secured between the countries of the MAU, several bilateral agreements have also been signed. They relate mainly to the energy sector. One example is the construction of a gas pipeline linking Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, which will enable Algerian gas to be supplied to the Libyans. Another gas pipeline is planned for the provision of Algerian gas to Morocco. It might be extended to supply the gas to Spain and Portugal. There is also the hookup of the electricity networks of four of the MAU countries, except for Mauritania. The Community has got involved in commercial programmes which raise or relax barriers to the entry of agricultural or industrial products coming from the East to the market of the Twelve. It envisages the reinforcement of these measures in a move towards real free trade and closer co-operation with the countries of the East. This new element in the EEC's external relations gives rise to concern on the part of third countries who fear that the attention of the Community and of the European investors might shift towards the countries of the East. We do not consider it worth dwelling on the justification of these fears. It is clear that since the EEC's resources are not bottomless, and since the recovery of the countries of the East is a geo-political factor of at least equal importance for the EEC as the Maghreb is, the answer has to be 'yes, this is a real risk'. What interests us more is establishing the role that Maghreb integration might play in this context. Before we address this issue, let us first look at the context of future relations between the EEC and the Maghreb.
The European Commission, aware of the fears of Mediterranean third countries in the face of its mobilisation towards the East, has proposed to the Council a revised policy for the Mediterranean. This policy aims to reinforce the process of economic reforms and to bring about a significant improvement in the volume and financing arrangements of these processes and of economic growth. The intention would be to implement actions to relieve the burden of debt and to allow textiles gradually to enjoy the benefits of free access to the EEC's market. The Commission also anticipates the introduction of rules authorising the cumulation of origins for groupings of Mediterranean third countries so requesting. The three Maghreb countries do, it should be noted, already benefit from this system and have done so since 1978. As far as agricultural trade goes, the Commission considers reexamination of the EEC policy in connection with ceiling quotas, timescales and new products.
Turning to the role of Maghreb integration in the present world context, this appears as more vital now than ever for these three countries. Unless there is a concrete and determined initiative in this direction, the countries are in danger of getting marginalised.
The policies of relocation embarked upon by certain European enterprises would be liable to be redirected towards the East, which offers the advantage not only of geographical closeness and production costs comparable to those in the Maghreb, but also the attractions of a market capable of absorbing part of the production if the countries of the East make a go of their recovery. Integration in the Maghreb would offer these enterprises a market of over 60 million inhabitants, almost one fifth of the EEC. Furthermore, the improved purchasing power which might result from integration would reduce the handicap carried by the Maghreb countries. In connection with these points, even the Maghreb's industrial exports are liable to suffer on account of this situation on the European market if they find themselves up against exports from companies who have relocated to the East. In view of the fact that the industrial fabric is more homogeneous in the East (Ben Salem, 1991) , the Maghreb engineering, electrical and assembly industries will be the most severely affected7. Finally, close collaboration between the countries of the Maghreb aimed at improving their agriculture will enable them to make the most of the CAP reforms and EEC concessions on agricultural products within the framework of GATT.
V. Prospects for regional integration in the Maghreb
The conclusions of the present paper can be split into three parts. The first two focus on the costs and benefits that the Maghreb countries could expect from integration. The internal dimension is examined first. The external dimension is, then, analysed with particular reference to the EEC. The third part covers the problems which still remain to be solved before the benefits of integration can be fully enjoyed.
1. Economic consequences of integration: the internal dimension.
The ultimate aim of any economic integration is, of course, the improvement of the welfare8 of the populations concerned. Improvement of welfare depends upon growth and its It is quite significant in this respect that because it was never integrated, the Maghreb has never made the most of the rule on cumulation of origins which it has enjoyed as far as the EEC is concerned since 1978. distribution among the economic agents. We deal here with the aspect of growth, and come on to look at redistribution later.
The analysis of the impact of integration on growth follows the traditional approach: it distinguishes the static effects (level effect) from the dynamic effects (effect on growth rate). Among the static effects a distinction is made between perfect and imperfect competition framework.
a. Static effects
The basis for the static analysis with perfect competition is the theory of comparative advantages. Where two or more countries have different factorial endowments, the removal of barriers to trade between them enables each one to specialise in the fields in which it does best. This specialisation leads to production becoming as efficient as possible at the international level. It has a positive effect on welfare because it allows activities to be 'allocated' according to the abilities of each party. The effects of integration require, however, to be tempered where it is regional and not global. This factor has been pointed out by Viner (1950) , who distinguished between the effects of the creation of trade (beneficial effect) and the effects of the diversion of trade (detrimental effect). The final effect of a regional free-trade agreement will depend upon how much trade is created compared to how much is diverted. The positive effect will be more dominant where the partners tend to specialise in the activities where they are the most competitive.
The foregoing analysis shows that the more different the countries are (competitive in different areas), the greater are the potential benefits to be derived from free trade. However, this does not imply that the gains from free trade between similar countries are negligible. The scale of trade between different industrialised countries, especially those in Europe, is evidence of this. This trade, which is made up largely of intra-industrial exchanges (Sapir, 1992) , clearly shows the benefits of specialisation, which go beyond the allocative effect deriving from the theory of comparative advantages. The analysis of these benefits has been explored in the new theory of international trade (Dixit and Norman, 1980; Helpman and Krugman, 1985) . This theory introduced the concepts of imperfect competition and economies of scale. It showed that even countries which were similar in terms of factorial endowment could benefit from specialising in order to exploit economies of scale. The lessons of this theory are at the basis of the analysis of the benefits expected from the 1992 programme and set out in the report 'Cost of Non-Europe' (Commission of the European Communities, 1988) . This report shows that the elimination of the segmentation of the European market by means of non-tariff barriers (norms, standards, etc.) will lead to an intensification of competition between European producers. It will promote better exploitation of economies of scale, with the result being a drop in prices and an increase in quantities.
b. Dynamic effects
The assessment of the dynamic effects draws on recent developments in the new theory of endogenous growth (Romer, 1990; Lucas, 1988; Young, 1991, etc.) While the neo-classical theory explains long term growth in per capita income by external technical progress, the new theory of growth focuses on imperfect competition, research and development (R&D) and economies of scale as the factors determining technical progress arid growth.
In order to distinguish between the static and dynamic effects of integration, we shall refer to the previous analysis, restricting ourselves at this stage to economies of scale. As we have seen, the opening up of the market will improve efficiency in the production process: for the same level of inputs, the level of output is higher. But this is just the first effect. The gain in efficiency brings about an increase in income and will be followed by an increase in savings and investments. Production will increase again. This second increase in production is by Baldwin (1989) as a medium-term effect. If at this stage of the analysis we bring in the existence of economies of scale, then the second increase we were looking at will decrease the production costs and increase the rate of return on the capital. The result will be a new increase in investment, because in the face of better returns on savings, thanks to the increase in capital returns, the consumer will be ready to defer a part of its consumption and to save and invest. So what we will have is a new increase in production, which will in turn give rise to a new increase in the rate of return on capital, savings, etc. If the economies of scale are sufficiently great, we will have a permanent increase in the rate of growth of the economy.
c. Synthesis of the implications for the Maghreb Leaving aside for the moment their relations with the EEC, the Maghreb countries could expect various types of gains to arise from their integration. Firstly, a certain reallocation of activities might occur within the region. A new division of economic activities between the three countries involved, according to the comparative advantages of each one, wifi make for greater efficiency in the production process and a net gain in welfare for the area as whole. The intensification of competition on the Maghreb market and the possible exploitation of the economies of scale resulting from the opening up of the markets of the three countries (going from 25 or 10 miffion consumers to 60 million) will also go hand in hand with greater efficiency in the production process (cutting exchange costs, exploitation of economies of scale), an increase in output (competition, price reductions, etc.) and a restructuring of the productive apparatus (elimination of the less competitive enterprises and geographical reallocation of activities).
We must add to these static gains the potential dynamic benefits, which, in the case of European integration, for example, are expected to be quite appreciable. The fact is that the static gains at issue, by increasing national revenue and the rate of return on capital, will also serve to increase savings and investments, thereby setting in motion a cumulative process of economic growth. Naturally, the added welfare deriving from integration must be tempered by the potential effects of diversion of trade. However, given the volume of trade transactions between the Maghreb and the EEC, it seems to us that a temporal coincidence between Maghreb integration and free trade with the EEC will substantially reduce the negative effects of the diversion of trade.
Making an exact assessment, with figures in support, of the benefits of Maghreb integration will call for research on a scale that goes beyond this study. However, the results of certain studies, such as that carried out by Haddad in 1993, on the link between opening up trade and the efficiency of production in Morocco, tend to indicate that integration in the Maghreb is likely to yield substantial advantages.
A final argument related to the internal dimension of Maghreb integration, concerns the role it could play in calming the political and military tensions between the three countries. This argument is far from negligible. It has already been adduced in favour of European integration. The founding fathers of the EEC also saw it as a way of reducing the risks of intra-European war, especially between France and Germany. When one recalls that one of the reasons for the small scale of the intra-Maghreb trade is a political disagreement (see Algeria-Morocco prior to 1987) , this argument becomes all the more cogent.
Economic consequences of integration: the external dimension
The aim here is to establish the extent to which integration in the Maghreb would offer an additional benefit connected with trade with the rest of the world and especially the EEC. In doing this, we draw partly on Baldwin (1992) , who looks into the degrees of complementarity between intra-regional integration in Eastern Europe and free trade with the rest of Europe. We shall touch on two major arguments: that of economic geography linked to direct foreign investments, and that of political economy, linked to protectionist pressures and bargaining power.
a. Economic geography
The first type of argument is based upon the theoretical works of Krugman (1991) , which lead to the analysis of the impact of commercial policies on the location of firms. The factors determining the location are production costs, the size of the market and the trading costs9 ( insurance, customs tariffs, etc.) The presence of economies of scale plays an important role in this theory.
The decision to locate a firm in a particular geographical area is the result of a trade-off between the advantages in terms of production costs in that area 10, the size of the market accessible from that location and the cost of getting access to that market. Economies of scale militate in favour of a restricted number of locations to serve the entire market. For the sake of simplicity, we assume the number to be one. If commercial relations between the countries of the Maghreb and between the countries of the EEC are governed by free trade, then the size of the market accessible and the cost of access to the various parts of it will favour neither the EEC nor the Maghreb. The production costs, which remain the only discriminating element, militate in favour of moving to the Maghreb. If, on the other hand, the Maghreb countries set up barriers to trade between them and free trade of each of them with the EEC, this may have a major bearing on the decision of where to locate. While these countries keep their advantage in terms of production costs, the EEC gets the advantage in terms of the size of the market accessible and in terms of the cost of accessing it. Indeed, a firm that locates within the territory of the EEC has cost-free access to all the markets concerned. If it chooses to locate in one of the Maghreb countries, the market to which it will have access for no cost becomes limited to that of its host country and the EEC. Access to the other Maghreb countries becomes more costly. The advantage of the EEC in terms of the size and access costs of the market might be sufficient to offset the Maghreb's advantage in terms of production costs. This example clearly shows that maintaining trade barriers within a region can make it considerably less attractive to foreign investors, even if they trade freely with a major partner such as the EEC. liberalism, integration, etc.) are beneficial in the long term, they can be costly in the short term, especially in terms of jobs and unemployment. EEC aid thus becomes essential to smooth the transition in these crucial times. The success of these reforms is not only central to the future of the countries of the Maghreb, it is also important for Europe, which would be likely to be affected by any destabilisation of this region.
Two additional considerations will affect the outcome of the Maghreb integration process. Firstly, a gradualist approach in the geographical coverage and in the economic fields concerned by the integration. From this point of view, the process might initially be confined to the integration of the markets and involve only Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Libya and Mauritania may join the process once the political and economic system of the former has moved closer to those of the other three and the latter (Mauritania) has clarified the situation regarding all its involvements. The treatment of the latter aspect is, of course, far from a simple affair, given the existence of the MAU.
Secondly, the introduction of mechanisms for the redistribution of the profits of integration. The point is that the benefits and costs of integration may affect the economic agents in the Maghreb in different ways. Some who will be more closely aware of the costs of integration (in terms of restructuring, job losses, etc.) than its benefits might constitute a serious blockage in the process, especially at election times. This type of resentment might be exacerbated by well-organised pressure groups hostile to integration. The redistribution mechanisms then become crucial if this risk is to be obviated. The mechanisms have played an important role in the European Community, for instance, especially since the Community was extended to cover the countries of the south (Sapir, 1992) .
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The political and economic elements referred to above will determine the credibility of Maghreb integration. In view of the past failures and the faltering progress of the MAU, the benefits of integration will become fully apparent only if the local and foreign economic players give it credibility. The European Community can play an important role in fostering this credibility. The legal framework within which this action would occur remains to be established, but one avenue might be a linkage between Maghreb integration and the concessions granted by the EEC under its co-operation policy. The Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey (ERF) was established in June 1993 as an independent, non-profit regional networking organization. Its mission is to promote policy-relevant economic research with a broad representation of views to help activate the policy-formulation debate in the region, by encouraging and funding quality research, and by disseminating results of research activities to economists and policy-makers.
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